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Abstract 
 
Purpose: Several well-known managerial accounting performance measurement 
models rely on causal assumptions. Whilst users of the models express satisfaction and 
link them with improved organizational performance, academic research, of the real-
world applications, shows few reliable statistical associations. This paper provides a 
discussion on the ‘problematic’ of causality in a performance measurement setting.   
 
Design/methodology/approach: This is a conceptual study based on an analysis and 
synthesis of the literature from managerial accounting, organizational theory, strategic 
management and social scientific causal modelling. 
 
Findings: The analysis indicates that dynamic, complex and uncertain environments 
may challenge any reliance upon valid causal models.  Due to cognitive limitations and 
judgmental biases, managers may fail to trace correct cause-and-effect understanding of 
the value creation in their organizations. However, even lacking this validity, causal 
models can support strategic learning and perform as organizational guides if they are 
able to mobilize managerial action.  
 
Research limitations/implications: Future research should highlight the characteristics 
necessary for elaboration of convincing and appealing causal models and the social 
process of their construction. 
 
Practical implications: Managers of organizations using causal models should be clear 
on the purposes of their particular models and their limitations.  In particular, 
difficulties are observed in specifying detailed cause and effect relations and their 
potential for communicating and directing attention. They should therefore construct 
their models to suit the particular purpose envisaged.  
  
Originality/value: This paper provides an interdisciplinary and holistic view on the 
issue of causality in managerial accounting models.   
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1. Introduction 
Performance measurement models similar to the Balanced Scorecard represent one of 
the most important managerial innovations of recent years (Otley, 1999). Substituting 
traditional performance measurement systems, causal performance measurement 
models1 (PMMs) are meant not only to measure and control but also guide companies’ 
performance.  For the latter purpose, the company’s strategy is translated into a set of 
quantifiable ‘cause-and-effect’ linkages including both financial and non-financial 
indicators representing value creating activities and their outcomes (Kaplan and Norton, 
2001b).  
 
Whilst being central to the causal PMMs, such as the Balanced Scorecard, the 
assumption of quantifiable and predictable causal links appears to be problematic in 
real-life applications (Malmi, 2001; Malina et al., 2007). On the one hand, most of the 
empirical academic studies show no reliable statistical associations between non-
financial indicators and financial outcomes. On the other hand, many of the users of the 
causal PMMs have associated these models with improvements in perceived 
organisational performance (Ittner et al., 2003; De Geusier et al., 2009).  
 
These controversial findings served as the motivation for our work.  If academic 
research has shown that the causal links in PMMs are weak, why is it that these models 
are still heavily used in practice?  That is, if the prevalence of reliable quantifiable links 
is so rare in complex and dynamic business environments why do causal PMMs 
continue to be so popular and attractive to their users?    
 
The objective of this paper is to analyse these possibly conflicting properties of causal 
PMM system design and the implications they may have for organisational decision 
making.  The work contributes to existing accounting literature in this area, which so far 
is quite fragmented, by making a synthesis and analysis of the existing studies on 
implementation of causal PMMs. To help explain our analysis, we adopt an inter-
disciplinary focus and analyse academic studies from perspectives of managerial 
accounting, organisation theory, strategic management and social scientific causal 
modelling, and relate them to causal PMMs.  The paper will therefore prompt the users 
                                                
1 Other definitions are also applicable to these models such as multidimensional performance 
measurement models, strategic managerial accounting systems. 
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of causal PMMs to reflect on the role which causal models play in their organisations, if 
necessary to modify their approach to the models, to be more aware of their limitations, 
and thus may facilitate the extraction of greater value from the models. 
 
The structure of the paper is explained below.  In Section 2, we shall briefly overview 
PMMs with particular reference to the Balanced Scorecard model because this is the 
most prominent model and has received the greatest research focus.  Then in Section 3, 
we clarify causality and review the contemporary practitioner-oriented literature and 
academic accounting studies on causal PMMs. Section 4 will explore the causal 
properties of PMMs from an interdisciplinary point of view. In Section 5, we summarise 
and synthesise our findings, arguing that “true” causal links are unstable and difficult to 
trace, but even if causal links are lacking validity, when it comes to clarifying and 
communicating strategic vision, they can be efficient story-tellers.  We then draw out 
some of the implications of our analysis, the questions it raises and offer suggestions for 
future research.  
 
2. PMMs and the Balanced Scorecard 
 
The Balanced Scorecard (BSC) is, perhaps, the most popular and widely known among 
causal performance measurement approaches
2
. Recent surveys conducted on the topic 
of the BSC implementation revealed that approximately half of the larger companies in 
the USA and Western Europe use its framework3 in some way (Russell, 2003). 
According to the surveys undertaken by consulting company Bains & Company (2011) 
the BSC model is consistently ranked as one of the most pertinent and popular 
management tools and the rate of satisfaction of users between 1996 and 2010 has been 
around ‘4’ on a 5-point scale.   
 
It was developed by the academics and consultants Robert Kaplan and David Norton, 
after they conducted research in several American companies, and presented first in 
1992 (Kaplan and Norton, 1992). A series of subsequent publications refined the BSC 
                                                
2 Other documented approaches are The Tableau de Bord (Bourguignon et al., 2004) and the Action Profit 
Linkage Model (Epstein and Westbrook, 2001). 
3 We shall point out later that there is evidence of some companies claiming to have a Balanced 
Scorecard, yet on closer examination this has been questionable. 
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concept and put it in the centre of strategy -making (Kaplan and Norton, 1996a, 1996b, 
2001a, 2004).  
 
Once a company defines its strategic vision it should translate it into a strategy map 
(Kaplan and Norton, 2001b). A strategy map visualises and communicates a strategy via 
hypothesised cause-and-effect links between value-creating activities and desired 
strategic outcomes.  Relationships, included in a strategy map, are quantified with 
indicators chosen from four major organisational perspectives: Learning and Growth, 
Customers, Internal Business Processes, and Financial4.  
 
Selected indicators are linked in a cause-and-effect chain. Some of them serve as lead 
indicators, driving a certain activity of the company. Others perform as lag indicators, 
signalling about the outcome of this activity.  For instance, if the order execution time is 
a lead indicator, the increased turnover is a lag one.  If the company directs its effort to 
the shortening of order execution time, it is assumed it will attain an increased turnover.  
Through these causal relationships, the indicators not only measure certain factors in 
isolation but also tell a story about how value is created in order to fulfil strategic 
objectives.  The idea to convert strategy into a set of plausible and coherent causal 
relationships between leading and lagging indicators constitutes the essence of the BSC 
philosophy.  Furthermore, targets should be set for the indicators selected by a company 
and incentive schemes tied to the realisation of these targets. In this way, the managerial 
effort and attention will be directed towards the critical issues for accomplishing the 
organisation’s goals.   
 
Linear cause-and-effect chains are a powerful element of the architecture of this model. 
They claim to demonstrate how desired results can be achieved and where the company 
should concentrate its efforts and investments.  In this respect, the model assumes that 
both company activities and the external environment are to the greater degree 
controllable, measurable and predictable. Engaging in active learning and measurement 
procedures, they claim that companies can execute ambitious strategies and constantly 
improve their market position. The philosophy of “achievement”, “best results”, 
                                                
4 The canonical form of the BSC includes four perspectives, but the number and content of the 
perspectives can be adjusted for particular organizational contexts. For instance, the Supplier perspective 
or an Environmental perspective can be found in a number of known BSC applications.  
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“excellence”, and “superior profitability” underpins the causal performance 
measurement movement.  
 
3. The concept of causality  
The BSC model does not contain an explicit definition of causality; however it calls for 
use of statistical techniques in order to validate causal beliefs of managers formulated in 
the model, suggesting that indicators of hypothesised causal links have to be 
significantly correlated.  Criticising the BSC assumption of causality, Norreklit (2000) 
refers to causality requiring events to be observed and proven empirically, containing a 
well-defined temporal lag with the relationship being distinct from a logical one.  
Following this, she points out that empirical evidence on BSC causality links is scarce 
and mixed (see also Norreklit and Mitchell, 2007); the time dimension is not specified 
in the model design; and the relationships among perspectives are more likely to be 
logical in their nature.  In other words, the causal links in PMMs are in fact more 
expressions of managerial beliefs about means needed to achieve specific strategic ends.  
 
Causality is a notoriously elusive phenomenon; for example, the complexity of the 
business environment also implies that a relationship found to apply at one time and 
under a given set of conditions will not necessarily be observed in the future or under 
another set of conditions. Therefore, if the possibility of causal relationships is 
acknowledged in a managerial context, it cannot be treated as continuous, unambiguous 
and exception-free in its nature, but rather considered probabilistic (Pearl, 2000).  The 
norms of probabilistic causation imply that a given cause will not necessarily produce a 
specified effect and a given effect can be produced by another cause.  So customer 
loyalty programs will not always boost customer satisfaction and satisfied customers 
will not necessarily drive up company sales. Yet, managers could assume that satisfied 
customers are more likely to repeat a purchase. An important caveat here is that none of 
the causal PMMs refers to probabilistic causation principles, and furthermore statistical 
correlations between performance measures are not sufficient to claim causality.   
    
3.1. Practitioners’ literature on causal PMMs 
Causal PMMs are a very popular topic in practitioners’ business publications, often 
using anecdotal evidence of considerable success, and thus contributing to the 
enthusiasm regarding causal models (see for example, Eccles, 1991, Magretta, 2002, 
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Crosby and Sheery, 2006). The causal performance measurement movement is 
spreading over the world through numerous practitioners’ conferences and seminars, 
with consulting companies actively selling and propagating causal PMMs, especially 
the BSC5. The following citation from one practitioners’ journal is characteristic of it: 
 
 Causal relationships among PMM measures are an important design criterion and 
feature of a successful customer loyalty strategy. Conversely, a PMM without valid 
causal relations is ineffective or counterproductive to communication and motivation.  
(Crosby and Sheery 2006, p.13) 
 
Rucci et al. (1998), Kaplan and Norton (2001b, pp.309-311) describe the business 
model of Sears Roebuck Company, which is built upon the assumption of existence of 
causal linkages, going from employee attitudes through customer satisfaction to profits6.   
Epstein and Westbrook (2001) describe causal business models implemented by the 
Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce (CIBC) and the Browning Ferris Industries 
(BFI)7.   
 
Despite being very encouraging, the stories of Sears, CIBC and BFI companies are not 
conclusive. Probably for confidentiality reasons, no information is disclosed in the 
above cited articles, and this limits a proper scientific judgement of the exposed 
evidence.  Furthermore, Ittner and Larcker (2003) report that among 157 companies 
they surveyed, only 23% consistently built and verified causal models.  Yet, this limited 
number of companies, on average, had higher ROA and ROE than companies that did 
not use causal models. 
                                                
5 A search on Google about the BSC will give over 5 million links 
6
On the basis of statistical elaboration of the collected data, Sears came up with the following cause and effect chain: 
5 points improvement in employee attitudes drives 1.3 points of increase in customer satisfaction, which in turn 
drives up 0.5% of the revenue. Sears claims that after implementing the model, customer satisfaction increased by 
4%. This resulted in $200 million increase in revenues.   
7 The CIBC managers arrived at the following model: a 5% increase in employee commitment, drives a 2% increase 
in customer loyalty, which results in 72$ annual increase in customer profitability.  Similarly, in BFI, (which in the 
past faced the problem of high customer-defection) causal analysis allowed it to detect the drivers of customer 
satisfaction. The investment programs aligned with the results of causal analysis brought a 3% decline in customer-
defection rate. The latter had a profound impact on company profitability. 
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3.2 Academic literature on causal PMMs 
Academic literature provides mixed and contradictory evidence on causal PMMs
8
.  It is 
not at all clear whether PMMs deliver the promised economic and financial 
improvements.  According to Ittner and Larcker (2008) many of the papers, which study 
empirically the association between the usage of performance measurement models and 
economic returns, suffer from serious methodological errors. Ittner et al. (2003), in their 
extensive survey of the financial services industry, found a positive association between 
BSC usage and ‘perceived organisational performance’ but a negative association with 
its ‘financial performance’. Similarly, Malmi (2001) indicates that all interviewees in 
his study had a positive attitude toward their BSC; however the effects of using the 
models were not quantified.  He conducted interviews on the BSC implementation with 
the managers of seventeen Finish companies and points out that most of the 
interviewees misunderstood the cause-and-effect logic. Specifically, some of the 
companies replied that  “we do not know how much some factors and measures affect 
other factors and that there might be a chance to  establish such relationships in future” 
and “we are not so far along yet” (Malmi, 2001, p. 210).  The managers interviewed 
perceived the BSC perspectives independently from each other. Malmi suggests further 
research needs to be done on cause-and-effect weaknesses of the BSC applications.  
 
It seems that most of the companies experience difficulties developing and testing 
causal links.  Ittner and Larcker (2003) pointed out that among the diverse US 
companies that they surveyed only 30% developed formal business models and tested 
causal links.   Papalexandris et al. (2004) report that after implementing the BSC in a 
large software company in Greece, the strategic objectives which managers perceived as 
strongly correlated appeared to be uncorrelated.  However, Cohen at al (2008) found 
evidence to support the hypothesis that there is some sequential dependency among 
non-financial BSC perspectives.    
 
Malina et al. (2007) describe the process of building a causal PMM designed in a large 
American company for tracking the performance of distributors. Managers of this 
company believed in numerous cause-and-effect relationships postulated in the model. 
                                                
8 Most of the studies undertaken are related to the BSC 
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However, statistical tests of hypothesised causal relationships demonstrated that only a 
few of them were significant and overall the model had no predictive ability. The 
authors were puzzled with their findings because apparently the model was still used for 
strategic communication, the setting of incentives in the company and managers were 
globally ‘satisfied’ with it.  
 
Luft (2004) indicates that, in reality, most of the applications are causally weak and 
hypothesises several reasons for such “weaknesses”. In particular, these are the high 
cost of the analysis, uncertainty of the processes of value generation and conflicting 
views which managers may have on “true” cause-and-effect relationships.  Otley (1999) 
considers the causal assumption of the BSC simplistic: “..a linear chain is suggested 
whereby better trained employees in the Innovation, Learning and Growth category will 
lead to better business processes being designed (one input to such changes, but surely 
by no means the only one); these in turn will lead to more satisfied customers and then 
to happier shareholders. Although a plausible chain of events, it is again very much a 
simplification of reality” (Otley, 1999, p.375).  
 
In summary, relatively few companies engage in formally testing their causal models, 
finding the hypothetical causal links either self-evident, or such analysis much too 
complex. Very few academic studies, which have attempted statistical analysis on 
hypothetical causal links, establish causality.  Notwithstanding this, most of the users of 
advanced PMMs express their satisfaction and perceive improvements in organisational 
performance associated with the usage of PMMs.  How is it that academic research has 
shown that the causal links of PMMs are weak, yet these models are still used in 
practice? How can we explain and reconcile this tension?   The apparent controversy, 
which the studies convey, leads us to analyse the main factors, which may impede 
construction of a valid causal PMM.  We shall proceed to explore this from a number of 
perspectives.   
 
4. An interdisciplinary view of causal links of PMMs 
4.1 Organisation Theory: uncertainty and the role of accounting models 
The overview of causal PMMs suggests that these models are aimed to help set clear 
and definite goals for organisations, measured by explicit standards. Therefore, such 
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models allow for the possibility of exerting control and influence over the internal and 
the external organisational domains.  In the context of organisation theory, ‘closed 
systems’ and ‘open systems’ are well known (Thomson, 1967).  Closed-system logic 
refers to a deterministic system with complete knowledge about cause-and-effect 
relationships in its structure. This originated in the Scientific Management Movement, 
which dates back to the Taylorist theory at the beginning of the last century and is based 
on the notion of rational resource allocation fitting a master plan.  In contrast, open-
system logic views organisations as natural systems, as parts of a wider social and 
economic system, having its own dynamic and often unpredictable outcomes.  
 
“Closed-system” strategists think about organisations in terms of rational pursuit of 
optimal targets and maximising results. “Open-system” strategists are just interested in 
naturalistic organisational behavior. Both approaches are at times relevant, since much 
of organisational action is “purposeful and rational”, but at the same time, part of it 
resides in informal interaction, is unpredictable and is heavily dependent on the external 
environment.  
 
Administrative theory distinguishes three levels of responsibility and control in 
organisations, namely, technical, managerial and institutional. The technical level 
comprises controls directly related to the production tasks in organisations. The 
managerial level provides services for the technical level, and interacts with the external 
environment, undertaking selling and procurement activities. The institutional level 
encompasses rules and norms of the external environment.  Only the technical level can 
approximate a closed system, where all the relevant variables and their 
interrelationships are known.  The managerial level interacts with the institutional level 
and therefore it can be influenced by the external environment and thus rarely can it 
resemble a closed system. The institutional level is the one, which brings even more 
uncertainty and unpredictability, since organisations have no formal control and 
influence in this domain. In his seminal work on Organisation Theory, Thomson (1967, 
p10) observed “The fact is, that our culture does not contain concepts for 
simultaneously thinking about rationality and indeterminess”.  We shall now consider 
the implications of this for managerial decision-making and performance measurement.    
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All organisations seek to plan their future and evaluate their performance. In doing this, 
they would prefer clear and unambiguous assessment of efficiency over other types of 
assessment. However, the usage of explicit assessment of efficiency may be appropriate 
mostly for closed-systems where complete knowledge of cause-and-effect relations 
exist. At different organisation levels and faced with different degrees of uncertainty 
about the environment, different decision strategies are appropriate.   
 
How does this apply to accounting practice?  Following the above ideas about the 
variety of decision strategies in organisations, Burchell et al. (1980) apply them to 
accounting practices, suggesting that accounting practices may play different roles 
depending on the degree of uncertainty of cause-and-effect and organisational 
objectives (See Table 1).  
 
 
 
Table 1 Uncertainty, decision making and the roles of accounting practices 
 
  Uncertainty of objectives 
  Low High 
 
 
Uncertainty of 
cause and effect 
 
Low 
 
Answer machines 
 
 
Ammunition machines 
 
 
High 
 
Learning machines 
 
 
Rationalisation machines 
 
Adopted from Burchell, S., Clubb, C., Hopwood, A.G., Hughes, J. and Nhapiet, J. 1980 “The role of 
Accounting in Organisations and Society, Accounting, Organisations and Society, Vol. 5, No. 1, p. 14 
 
 
When uncertainty of cause-and-effect is low and objectives are clear, accounting 
techniques can act as “answer machines”. Involving computation and formulas, they 
produce reliable solutions and give accurate feedback. When uncertainty of cause-and-
effect is high accounting systems would perform as “learning machines”. Organisational 
actors then need to formulate hypotheses, analyse, and make judgments. Low 
uncertainty about cause-and-effect and unclear objectives, means that different 
organisational actors and groups hold conflicting views on organisational goals. Then, 
accounting models are employed as “ammunition machines”, defending different 
policies and advocating interests. High uncertainty about cause-and-effect and 
objectives can lead to situations where accounting models play the role of 
“rationalisation machines”. In other words, they are employed for creating meaning and 
portraying organisational rationality.  
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To summarise, managing in organisations is a constant balancing between formal and 
rigid control structures and flexible and open systems. Yet fundamentally, causal 
performance measurement models belong to the family of rationalised managerial 
techniques, encompassing the logic of closed systems. However the architecture of the 
causal PMM encompasses all three levels of control, technical, managerial, and 
institutional.  It can be expected that major problems with the model’s reliability will 
appear when dealing with their external domain, such as customer, supplier and 
institutional relationships, technological change etc. These are the areas which are not 
easily measurable and predictable. When the knowledge about cause-and-effect 
relations is certain and the environment is stable and predictable, causal PMM can 
potentially play the role of answer machines.  However, in dynamic and complex 
environments, the deterministic cause-and-effect assumptions have to be relaxed; can 
the model be used rather for “learning”, or as “ammunition” or a “rationalisation” 
device?  
 
4.2 Strategic Management: are Causal PMMs “blinders” or strategic learning 
tools? 
4.2.1 The Causal PMM and prescribing the strategy 
From the perspective of strategic management, causal PMMs represent analytical tools, 
which support formulation and implementation of strategy.  They can perform as 
decision aids within what Mintzberg et al., (2005) defined as the Prescriptive School of 
strategy.  The Prescriptive School includes the Design, Planning and Positioning 
School. The Design School is famous for its SWOT technique.  The Planning School 
brought to the managerial agenda the idea of detailed planning, the quantification of 
various objectives and targets and its culmination in a Master Plan. The Positioning 
School is based on industrial analysis involving generic market strategies and value 
chain analysis. Kaplan and Norton (2004) suggest that SWOT and industry analysis can 
be used as the first step of BSC design.   
 
The Prescriptive School assumes that strategy formation is a deliberate, conscious and 
controlled process, supported by rational, analytical and calculative techniques.  
Assisted by planners and analysts, chief executives bear the main responsibility for 
strategy formation, which must be formulated, formalised and made explicit before its 
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implementation (Mintzberg et al, 2005).  A critique levelled at the prescriptive approach 
is that it is built on the ambitious assumption that the environment can always be 
understood, currently and for periods well into the future; and that the environment 
itself is sufficiently stable, or at least predictable, to ensure that the formulated strategies 
today will remain viable after implementation.  Further, the prescriptive approach to 
strategy separates thinking and action. First, the strategy is conceived and then it is 
implemented. As such, it ignores the possibility for strategy to be emergent and 
incremental.  In the pursuit to make strategy explicit in organisations, inflexibility may 
be promoted, and learning may be suppressed.  “Moreover, even when uncertainty is 
low, the danger of articulating strategies must still be recognised. Explicit strategies are 
blinders
9
 designed to focus direction and so to block out peripheral vision. They can 
thus impede strategic change when it does become necessary” (Mintzberg et al., 2005, 
p.36). 
 
Another danger stems from a reliance on “hard” data in prescriptive strategy 
formulation because hard information is lacking contextual richness; it does not include 
gossip, rumour and intuition. Additionally, “hard” data may arrive late, be unreliable 
and cannot be easily aggregated. So, when it arrives to top managers it can give a 
distorted or incomplete picture of reality.  
 
Several studies have revealed the problems resulting from the deterministic nature of 
causal PMMs.  Voelpel et al. (2006) argue that the BSC framework is too static and 
rigid and does not accommodate the vision of those companies which rely on 
networking with collaborators and suppliers in their value creation. Laitinen (2004) 
developed a microeconomic model, which shows that with the change of strategy, the 
causal links may give a confusing signal to the users of the BSC10. Kasurinen (2002) 
describes a failed attempt to implement the BSC in a strategic business unit of a 
multinational Finland-based group. One of the major obstacles to successful 
                                                
9 Minzberg uses ‘blinders’ but some may prefer ‘blinkers’, as on a horse, used in this case to ensure its 
vision is narrowed.  
10
 When Nokia changed its strategic focus from profit growth to revenue growth, all the non-financial 
indicators leading to higher profitability were positive.  However, contrary to the modelled relationships, 
profitability indicators declined since prices decreased significantly as Nokia increased its volumes 
(Laitinen, 2004).  
 
.   
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implementation was the difficulty of selecting a unique strategy. According to the 
managers of this business unit, a variety of products, which could not be classified into 
the specific market niche and a large number of small customers, acted as a challenge to 
the strategy formulation.   
 
In summary, representing the analytical tools of the prescriptive school of strategy, 
causal PMMs are open to the criticism of being inflexible and unfriendly to the 
incremental, informal and participative approaches to strategy making.  Thus one of the 
major premises of the causal PMM, to formulate and describe the strategy through the 
causal links, can be challenged by strategic uncertainty, difficulties in elaborating a 
unique strategy, and possible conflicts between equally important strategic goals.  
However, can PMMs still contribute to strategy development?       
 
4.2.2 Causal PMMs as a strategic learning tool 
Despite the above criticism, Kaplan and Norton (2004) maintain that the BSC 
framework can be used for strategic learning and indicate that some companies 
modified and attenuated their strategies through constructing and testing their strategy 
maps. Kaplan (2009) suggests that in order to achieve greater strategic alignment an 
organisation’s BSC has to be employed as an interactive control system. This is in 
addition to the diagnostic control systems, “which are used to motivate, monitor and 
reward achievement of specific goals” (Simons, 1995, p.7), steps which initially 
received comprehensive coverage in the early BSC approach.    
 
In his theory of levers of control, Simons (1995) defines an interactive control system as 
the one, which is “used to stimulate organisational learning and the emergence of new 
ideas and strategies” (p.7).  These systems connect in their meaning with the “learning 
machines” of Burchell et al. (1980) Table 1 above.  Kaplan (2009) maintains that the 
BSC fits neatly into the definition of an interactive control system. Its implementation 
and usage requires active involvement of the CEO, attention from operational managers 
at all levels of the organisation and continuous debate and discussion of the data 
collected, which may possibly lead managers to question and modify strategy.   
 
Supporting this idea, Tuomela (2005) reported the case of the implementation of a 
PMM, containing causal links between strategic objectives. He describes the interplay 
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of diagnostic and interactive properties of the BSC during its implementation and points 
out that, in particular, managers were engaged in a dialog about strategic uncertainties, 
and cause-and-effect hypotheses were established based on managerial reasoning.   De 
Geusier et al. (2009) surveyed 73 business units of diverse European companies which 
implemented the BSC. They concluded that perceived organisational performance 
improved due to the better translation of the strategy into operational terms and the fact 
that strategising becomes a continuous process with greater alignment of processes and 
units in organisations.   
 
We shall return later, in section 7, to develop discussion of the support for strategy from 
PMMs, but first will address more broadly the role of ‘causal modelling’ in the social 
sciences.   
 
4.3 Social scientific causal modeling   
Causal modelling has a long-standing research tradition in the social sciences. Human 
understanding of a particular problem can be represented in the form of a mental model 
which we hold about issues and relationships. This can be represented visually by 
drawing a key set of variables (mental concepts) and interrelationships between them.  
Often, such modelling involves the construction of a causal map (Huff, 1990), which 
contains a set of variables (concepts) linked by causal beliefs or assertions explaining 
the relationships between the variables.   
 
In fact, a strategy map of a BSC is an example of a collective causal model, elaborated 
by a group of top managers; such a model represents a company’s strategic objectives 
linked causally. Causal mapping techniques are actively employed by researchers of 
strategic management11. Some of the findings in this area can be relevant for explaining 
the “weaknesses” of real- life causal PMMs.  
 
Hall (1984, 2002) applied causal modelling to business policy decisions, he points out 
that causal maps are a group effort of a ‘dominant coalition in the organisation’.  In his 
                                                
11 For a comprehensive overview of the techniques see Mapping Strategic Knowledge, Huff and Jenkins, 
Eds., 2002. 
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study of the business policy of a curling sports club he developed12 a map (Hall, 2002) 
of policy variables, intervening variables and goal variables.  In this relatively simple 
sports club, the map contained 24 direct causal influences among 15 active variables 
representing chains of cause-effect in the club’s operations.  The map contains 21 chains 
of influence (paths) and 8 feedback loops.   
 
Feedback loops can be particularly problematic; these are the circular paths of cause-
and-effect. They can lead to unpredictable results if they go unnoticed (Hall 2002, Huff, 
1990). In other words, they can confound simple cause-and-effect logic13. Positive 
causal feedback loops can lead to change and uncontrolled growth in variables and may 
result in problems for managers.  For instance, the number of members in sports club 
may grow exponentially if some of the members bring their relatives and friends, and 
these in turn will invite their friends.  This exponential growth may result in bottlenecks 
in sports club facilities.  Possible problems here is that circular causal paths are largely 
ignored by managers (Hall, 2002) and in large companies, the results of causal 
modelling are likely to be significantly more complex and voluminous in comparison 
with the sports club example presented. “This is not the stuff for the action-oriented 
managers who wish to make quick decisions and get on with other things” (Hall, 2002, 
p. 105).  
 
In his book “The Fifth Discipline. The art and practice of the Learning Organisation,” 
Senge (1990) maintains that thinking based on causal linearity is deeply embedded in 
our language and the mental models we create. “Contemporary research shows that 
most of our mental models are systematically flawed. They miss critical feedback 
relationships, misjudge time delays and often only focus on variables that are visible or 
salient” (Senge 1990, p. 203). At the same time, many business situations can be 
defined as situations of dynamic complexity, i.e. balancing market growth, capacity 
extension, developing a profitable mix of products and prices etc. According to Senge, 
circular, instead of linear, reasoning may greatly benefit managers.  
 
                                                
12 Hall interviewed the elite of sports club and then applied an Artificial Intelligence method to select the relevant 
variables. Scientific causal modelling may also employ interviewing, imagining, the use of images and storytelling by 
key organizational authors.  
13 The notion of feedback loops occurs in cybernetics.  For more on feedback loops, see Morgan, G. (1997).  
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Further shortcomings of causal maps are that causal linkages are assumed monolithic, 
that is, without time delays and disruptions, though this can be significantly different 
from reality (Huff, 1990). Furthermore a causal map elaborated by a group is subject to 
all types of individual judgmental biases. For instance, when making judgments, people 
were shown to underestimate uncertainty and base their judgment on non-existent 
causal relations14.    
 
How can the evidence described above be interpreted in the light of the causal PMM?    
If done in a rigorously scientific way, this exercise can be very time and effort 
consuming. Large companies and complex environments would include many boxes 
and causal linkages in their models and have to account for possible time delays, 
circular relationships and disruptions. The BSC and other models mentioned in Section 
2 rely on linear causal logic and largely ignore or give little attention to the existence of 
circular causal relationships.  In addition, all causal PMMs recommend the inclusion of 
a limited number of performance indicators and objectives. While being a reasonable 
element of the design of “workable” and comprehensible PMMs, this inevitably 
abstracts models from reality.  There is little doubt that causal PMMs can serve as a 
superior information and control tool in comparison to traditional managerial control 
systems.  The question is the extent to which it is feasible to trace any accurate, 
complete and comprehensive cause-and-effect understanding of the environment into 
the PMM, and if this is not the case what role causal links in PMMs may play.  
 
4.4. Causal PMMs as organisational guides 
 
The previous sections of analysis express a rather cautious and sceptical view on the 
potential of causal PMMs to objectively evaluate and “drive” organisational 
performance. It is legitimate, then, to ask how do organisations, act and learn if they are 
often guided by inaccurate models and limited assumptions about their environment?    
 
Weick (2001) argues that there are two major organisational solutions for coping with 
complex and uncertain environments. The first one consists of investing considerable 
time and effort in evaluating all the possible scenarios and their outcomes. Engaging in 
                                                
14 For a list of decision making biases relevant to strategic judgement see Makridakis, 1990, p.36-37    
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rational decision processes, organisational actors should consider as much detail as 
possible and carefully evaluate the various alternatives. However, this approach is 
costly and may lower the motivation needed for the implementation of the chosen 
alternative.  The other possibility is, neglecting the “subtle nuances”, simplify the 
reality, make a crude picture of it and concentrate the efforts on the action rather than 
the decision.   
 
The advantage of the second approach consists not only in the potential savings of 
organisational resources, but also that many managerial actions align with the notion of 
self-fulfilling prophecies. This is to say, even if the interaction of the organisation with 
the environment is estimated wrongly, initially; it may become appropriate in the future 
(Weick, 2001).  Prophecies (expectations or predictions made by managers) impact 
behaviour, mobilise action and in this way may come to realisation. A parallel can be 
drawn with regard to causal PMMs.  Even if the models are built on the unproven 
assumptions and predictions (prophecies), they can be significant, if they can mobilise 
organisational action.  
 
Weick (1990) described how a small Hungarian military detachment, which lost its way 
due to the snowstorm in Alps, managed to navigate its way out, but only later realised 
they navigated using a map of the Pyrenees. The moral of this story has important 
implications for organisations.  On some occasions, it does not matter how accurate the 
map is. Strategic plans, business models, causal maps can serve as important “binding 
mechanisms”.  If perceived as credible, they can impose order, influence actions and 
help to elaborate and motivate organisational direction and identity.   
 
“The important feature of a causal map (or any map) is that it leads people 
to anticipate some order out there. It matters less what particular order is 
portrayed than that an order of some kind is portrayed. The crucial dynamic 
is that prospect of order lures the manager into ill-formed situations that 
then accommodate to forceful actions and come to resemble the orderly 
relations contained in the causal map. The map animates managers, and the 
fact of animation, not the map itself, is what imposes order on the situation.” 
(Weick, 1990, p.7).  
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According to Weick and Bougon (2001, p. 323) causal maps “should exert influence 
when a situation is non-routine and requires something more than standard operating 
procedures. Maps will have more effect when key authors are relatively free of 
organisational constraints, when overload necessitates simplifying strategies, when 
stress impairs the performance of cognitively complex tasks, and when ambiguity is 
high”. 
 
Maps may contain inconsistent and equivocal relationships, yet they may be valuable 
tools for construction of meaning and communication in organisations because they 
assimilate uncertain events into a structure and generate meanings for the event. The 
causal map contains the structure, the process, and the material from which agreements 
and conflicts are built when people coordinate action. Thus, even being crude pictures 
of reality, maps can perform as guides, especially if the portrayed “territory” is 
unknown and complex. Returning to the possible roles of accounting practice described 
in Table 1 above (Burchell et al. 1980); Weick and Bougon’s “guides” would in this 
case correspond to the “rationalisation machines”.  Both lines of reasoning converge on 
the idea that the accounting models can create meaning and portray organisational 
order.   
 
The success of the BSC is due in part to the extensive use of graphical representations 
to illustrate its key ideas (Norreklit, 2003).  Cooper et al. (2012) argue that introduction 
of causal maps and usage of graphical information in the BSC framework was a very 
important step in popularising this approach and enhancing the rhetorical power of the 
framework.  The more complex the set of relationships, the more useful it is to 
graphically depict them using arrows to connect the boxes. In theorisation, graphics are 
powerful in delineating patterns and introducing causality. A visual representation is 
argued to increase the readers’ comprehension.  
 
Experimental studies also report that causal representation of information in PMMs 
facilitates strategic understanding.  Webb (2004) investigated the importance of causal 
structure in the models of strategic performance measurement. He demonstrated that 
well-articulated causal links help organisational actors to understand the mechanisms by 
which corporate objectives can be achieved.  Better understanding of the goals leads to 
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greater commitment by managers to achieve them. Hypothetically, then, a causal model 
has advantages over ordinary scorecards.   
 
Vera-Muñoz et al. (2007) demonstrated in their experiments that accountants prompted 
with causal business models made better decisions when allocating budgets between 
two alternative projects. Those participants who used causal business models were able 
to interpret data better and infer time-lagged causal relationships from it.  Banker et al. 
(2011) conducted an experiment where participants used the BSC for performance 
evaluation of two hypothetical business units. The results show that those participants 
who were provided with causal maps in addition to narrative description of strategy 
placed greater weight to the indicators, linked with strategic objectives. The authors 
conclude that the BSC implemented with a causal strategy map can greatly reduce the 
cognitive complexity for decision makers and potentially serve as a communication 
tool.  
 
Qu and Cooper (2011) described a longitudinal case study on the BSC development in 
the Canadian health-care service. They emphasised the importance of so called 
‘inscriptions”, such as reports, flip-charts, memos and maps in the implementation 
process because they help to adapt a generic accounting model to the local setting. They 
point out that persuasiveness and simplicity is very important. “According to 
consultants in AB Consulting, one key advantage of graphical presentations is their 
ability to communicate and present complex information in a summary and clear 
fashion” (Qu and Cooper 2011, p.358).  
 
Busco and Quattrone (2009) describe the case of BSC implementation in MEGOC, a 
large corporation, which operates in the oil and gas industry. They argue that the BSC 
can be viewed as a kind of rhetorical device because of its ability of organising, 
displaying and communicating knowledge. In particular, strategy maps helped actors to 
envisage the company mission and basic beliefs about strategic direction.  Managers 
were engaged in the BSC implementation by “searching sound cause-and-effect 
relationships to feed a reliable strategy map” (Busco and Quattrone, 2009, p.20).   
 
Thus, even inaccurate causal PMMs potentially may serve as guides in organisations. 
Causal arrows of PMMs capture strategic vision, and therefore can support 
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organisational sense-making as ‘rationalisation machines’. The concern about their 
truthfulness and validity here is not primary. Causal links may be a mere artefact, yet 
they have to be persuasive and appealing to managers.  The most, important issue, 
perhaps, is how credible and convincing the story is behind the causal arrows. And 
whether the “prophecies” stated in the model could come to be realised through 
mobilisation of managerial commitment.  
 
5. Summary and Conclusion 
The objective of this paper was to discuss the ‘problematic’ of cause-and-effect chains 
in performance measurement. Causal PMMs are one of the important recent trends in 
managerial accounting, which have generated a great deal of interest from both 
practitioners and academics.  Three of the known PMMs, the Balanced Scorecard, the 
Tableau de Bord and the Action-Profit Linkage model specifically rely on causal logic. 
The BSC was rated positively by managers, who perceived improvements in 
organisational performance associated with the usage of it in their organisations. 
However, most of the real-life applications appear to be causally “weak” and rigorous 
academic studies have shown limited support for robust quantitative cause-and-effect 
relations.  We therefore posed the question if academic research has shown that the 
causal links in PMMs are weak, why is it that these models are still heavily used in 
practice?   
 
In addressing this problem, an analysis of organisational theory draws attention to the 
importance of uncertainty both in external and internal organisational environments. 
Complete knowledge about cause-and-effect is hardly possible in complex, dynamic 
and uncertain environments. The latter, however, are the working conditions for most 
managers and companies today. In this case, causal deterministic PMMs may become 
unreliable and unrealistic. Tracing of ‘true’ cause-and-effect relationships will become 
very costly and resource-hungry. Besides, in order to keep in touch with reality, the 
models will require constant revision and adjustment which may prove to be unrealistic.  
All this may lead to the possibility for the causal PMMs to play roles different from 
those originally prescribed by their authors.  
 
In strategy-making the role of causal PMM requires further research.  On the one hand, 
conceptually the strategic management literature would place causal PMMs among the 
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prescriptive strategic approaches. This raises an important issue, which in part parallels 
the findings from organisational theory, that the assumption of predictability of the 
environment, which underpins causal PMMs, is ambitious.  Furthermore, with regard to 
formalisation and quantification of strategy, rigid adherence to causal PMMs may 
undermine the informal and spontaneous emergence of strategy. An emphasis which the 
prescriptive school puts on the usage of “hard” data and quantification is also criticised 
for its potential danger of missing important “soft” information, such as gossip and 
intuition.  On the other hand, the proponents of the BSC framework stress its ability to 
perform as part an interactive control system, activating strategic learning in 
organisations. Can PMMs therefore function as ‘learning machines’?  If this is the case 
however, the structure of the model and the way it is developed and used must receive 
careful and detailed attention.    
 
Findings from scientific causal modelling, point to the potential of this methodology for 
policy making in organisations. At the same time, they indicate that causal models 
simplify reality and their elaboration is subject to human cognitive limitations. Most 
managers don’t see circular causal relationships inherent in the nature of many business 
processes and none of the causal PMMs explicitly acknowledge their existence. The 
bigger and more diverse the organisation, the more causal arrows and boxes may be 
needed to capture its ‘true’ cause-and-effect structure and this could be problematic.  
Hence a comprehensive model may be complex, expensive and time-consuming to 
construct.   
 
Despite the problems with the validation of causality, from the point of view of 
organisational sense-making, causal maps may have significant potential as a 
communication and rhetorical device. The graphical representation of strategy, using 
causal links may facilitate a greater understanding of it and thus capture and focus 
managerial attention on key issues.  The importance of causal maps in this case would 
stem from providing a reference point, creating shared values and beliefs, providing 
inspiration for managers and acting as a platform for the discussion of strategic 
uncertainties and cause-and-effect assumptions.  In this case, ideally, causal chains 
should reproduce the prevailing beliefs and individual mental models of managers in 
organisations.  The models are therefore acting as “ammunition machines”, advocating 
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some vested interests or “rationalisation machines”, creating a semblance organisational 
order.   
 
The accuracy of any cause-and-effect relations is therefore less critical.  We would 
contend however that, as a consequence, how a given causal PMM is developed and 
implemented is very important.  If the approach is implemented interactively, and 
cause-and-effect linkages underlying strategy are open for discussion and questioning, 
the BSC framework may potentially engage companies in strategic learning. However, 
if the causal links are perceived as self-evident, imposed by senior management in a 
top-down fashion without further inquiries, they may act as strategic “blinders” and 
result in a misalignment of the organisation to its strategy.  This does raise important 
questions which can focus future research.  How, in practice, are individual maps 
assembled into the collective causal map?  To what extent do strategic causal maps 
influence individual mental models of managers?  What are the prerequisites for a 
collective causal map to be a guide and inspire coordinated action? What is the role of 
consultants and senior managers in the process of co-production of the causal maps?  
 
Comparing the different literature streams, it is also important to observe that 
uncertainty has two, rather opposite effects on the properties of causal links in PMMs 
which have important implications. On the one hand, uncertainty weakens the reliability 
of causal links. Companies, which wish to use their models for performance evaluation 
and setting of targets, have to be aware of the challenges posed by the dynamic and 
changing organisational environment.  In this case, we recommend formal testing and 
careful analysis of causal links with all its complex issues, such as estimation of time 
lags and circular relationships.  Otherwise they are ‘blinders’ to the complexity of the 
environment.    
 
However, causal links may have most useful and persuasive properties when dealing 
with uncertainty.  Since causal arrows, displaying visually the value creation chain, 
facilitates the understanding of strategy by managers and shapes its potential as a 
powerful communication tool, thus being ‘binders’ for collective development and 
pursuit of strategy. In this case, we recommend the promoters of causal models within 
companies should place emphasis on the concise format and visual appeal of their 
models, which have to be also coupled with efficient communication strategies in order 
MAJ 689_Final, proofread 
 
 24
to ensure the support of managers.  Future research is also encouraged in order to 
understand whether it is possible to combine effectively the analytical capability of 
causal PMMs and their potential as a communication medium, or if not, in which 
direction causal performance measurement modelling will eventually evolve. 
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